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Abstract
Whereas the European Commission officially intends to periodically evaluate all major
European Union legislation in force, in practice it only evaluates a minority of major
regulations and directives. This article tries to explain the variation in the initiation of
such ex-post legislative evaluations by the Commission with the help of two theoretical
motives: an enforcement motive and a strategic motive. Based on two novel datasets
and binary logistic regression analysis, the results show that the type and complexity of
the legislation, the presence of an evaluation clause and the evaluation capacity of the
responsible Directorates-General enhance the chances of evaluation. These findings
indicate that ex-post legislative evaluations are at least partly driven by the
Commission’s need to enforce legislation.
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Introduction
The European Union (EU) is often described as a ‘regulatory state’ due to the
important role of legislation in the European policy process (Majone, 1999: 1).
A marked feature of the European legislative process is the centrality of one
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supranational executive actor: the European Commission. The Commission has a
number of crucial tasks related to European legislation. Firstly, it is responsible for
the development and formulation of legislative proposals (Schmidt and Wonka,
2013: 2). Secondly, it produces delegated and implementing acts (McCormick,
2015: 169–172). Thirdly, in its role of ‘guardian of the European treaties’, the
Commission is responsible for monitoring and enforcing national compliance
with European legislation (McCormick, 2015: 169–172; Schmidt and Wonka,
2013: 2).
These three tasks of the Commission in the EU’s legislative process have
received ample academic scrutiny (e.g. Kassim et al., 2013; Schmidt and Wonka,
2013; Wille, 2013). Conversely, the literature has hardly touched upon a fourth key
task of the Commission, which is to conduct ex-post evaluations that assess the
functioning and eﬀectiveness of European legislation. So far, such ex-post legisla-
tive (EPL) evaluations have mostly been neglected by scholars (but see Fitzpatrick,
2012; Mastenbroek et al., 2016; Zwaan et al., 2016), which is all the more surprising
given both their theoretical importance and their growing role in the Commission.
Theoretically speaking, EPL evaluations may fulﬁl two important functions in
legislative processes. Firstly, by recommending how the implementation of legisla-
tion can be improved and/or how legislation can be amended to increase its eﬀect-
iveness, EPL evaluations are a potential tool for decision-makers to improve their
policies (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 479; Vedung, 1997: 109). Secondly, EPL evaluations can
be used to judge the performance of the actors that implement legislation, thus
holding them accountable for their actions (Coglianese, 2012: 11; Vedung, 1997:
102–108).
Over the years the Commission has increasingly recognized the importance of
EPL evaluations. It ﬁrst emphasized the role of such evaluations in legislative
improvement and accountability relationships in 2000, after which it started to
make its procedures for EPL evaluations more systematic in 2007 (European
Commission, 2007: 3–4; Fitzpatrick, 2012: 478). Since 2010 the Commission has
also stressed the importance of EPL evaluations for judging the suitability of entire
regulatory frameworks (so-called ‘ﬁtness checks’) (European Commission, 2010: 5).
Furthermore, from 2012 onwards it has given EPL evaluations a central place in its
REFIT programme, which aims to identify and remove superﬂuous rules
(European Commission, 2012: 4).
In 2015 the Commission published new guidelines that outline the methods,
follow-up procedures and institutional responsibilities for carrying out EPL evalu-
ations (European Commission, 2015). In principle, all the Commission’s EPL evalu-
ations must use some form of stakeholder consultation to map the views of those
actors that are directly aﬀected by European legislation (European Commission,
2015: 299–336). Aside from this, EPL evaluations can use diﬀerent combinations
of methods, such as expert interviews, document analysis and quantitative model-
ling (European Commission, 2015: 337–414; Fitzpatrick, 2012: 490–497).
Concerning the follow-up of EPL evaluations, the Commission is supposed to
produce an action plan based on the main recommendations of each evaluation to
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ensure that its results feed back into the ‘regulatory cycle’ (European Commission,
2015: 297–298). Existing research has shown that the extent to which this happens
varies in practice, such that about half of the ex-ante evaluations (impact assess-
ments) attached to proposals for legislative amendments make use of information
from EPL evaluations when available (van Golen and van Voorst, 2016: 388).
Concerning the institutional responsibility for EPL evaluations, the
Commission’s guidelines specify that such evaluations are the responsibility of
the Directorates-General (DGs), with a coordinating role for the Commission’s
Secretariat-General (SG) (European Commission, 2015: 257; Stern, 2009: 70–71).
EPL evaluations are usually based on reports written by external consultants to
enhance their independence, but when this is more practical the whole evaluation
process may also be conducted internally (European Commission, 2015: 282–289).
Importantly, since 2007 the Commission’s guidelines also prescribe that both
ﬁnancial and legislative activities must be evaluated periodically, in proportion to
their allocated resources and expected impact (European Commission, 2007: 22;
2015: 257). In reality, however, not all important EU legislation is evaluated.
Academic research has shown an initiation ratio of 33% for major EU regulations
and directives from the period 2000 to 2012 (Mastenbroek et al., 2016: 1338). The
European Commission (2013: 13) has produced similar ﬁgures: in 2013, 29% of all
important EU regulations had been evaluated, with a further 13% of these regu-
lations being evaluated at that moment, 19% of these regulations having a future
evaluation planned and no numbers being provided for directives.
These ﬁgures show that the Commission is apparently selective in which legis-
lation it evaluates, for reasons that the institution itself does not explain. This
ﬁnding is problematic because an evaluation system is only credible if its proced-
ures for initiating evaluations are systematic and transparent (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2015: 120). If this is not the
case, legislative quality may diminish in policy areas that are evaluated less fre-
quently (OECD, 2015: 120) and/or the image could arise that the Commission
decides what legislation to evaluate based on political considerations (Radaelli
and Meuwese, 2010: 146). This, in turn, could harm the credibility of evaluations
in the eyes of the legislator and other actors (Poptcheva, 2013: 4).
Therefore, this article looks into the question of what drives the initiation of
EPL evaluations by the Commission. In other words, why does the Commission
evaluate some pieces of law while it does not evaluate others? By answering this
question, we not only seek to shed light on the unexplored topic of EPL evaluations
in the EU, but also aim to further explore the motives that drive the Commission’s
behaviour (Boswell, 2008: 472; Franchino, 2007: 11; Hartlapp et al., 2015: 1;
Radaelli, 1999: 760–762; Wille, 2010: 1098–1100).
Two potential motives (not) to initiate an evaluation are studied in this paper,
each of which is linked to a speciﬁc theoretical image of the Commission. The ﬁrst
motive, which is in line with the image of the Commission as the ‘guardian of the
European treaties’, is the eﬀective enforcement of EU legislation. Since EPL evalu-
ations are a potential tool to check how legislation is implemented by the member
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states (European Commission, 2015: 296; Stame, 2008: 124), we can expect that
legislation for which the chances of non-compliance are higher is more likely to be
evaluated. The second motive is the strategic protection of competences, which is in
line with the image of the Commission as a political actor (Boswell, 2008: 472;
Hartlapp et al., 2015: 1; Majone, 2005: 65). Following this logic, we would expect
that the Commission refrains from evaluating legislation if this could result in a
reduction of its powers.
The hypotheses ﬂowing from these two motives are tested with the help of two
datasets, the ﬁrst containing all major EU legislation from 2000 to 2004 and the
second containing all EPL evaluations conducted by the Commission during 2000–
2014. With these data, we are able to draw conclusions about the Commission’s
decisions to evaluate European legislation over a 15-year period. The 10-year gap
between our datasets is needed to give the Commission enough time to evaluate,
thus avoiding any bias in our data in favour of legislation that was evaluated
sooner. Binary logistic regression was used for the analysis.
Our results show that EU legislation is more likely to be evaluated if it is a
directive rather than a regulation and if it is more complex, which is in line with the
enforcement motive. Both of our control variables – the presence of evaluation
clauses and the amount of evaluation capacity of the DG to which a piece of law
belongs – also provide signiﬁcant explanations. However, we did not ﬁnd evidence
that the strategic protection of competences explains the Commission’s initiation of
EPL evaluations.
Theoretical framework
Whereas evaluation-related topics are frequently discussed in the academic litera-
ture, there is no comprehensive approach to explaining why organizations decide to
evaluate or not (Mastenbroek et al., 2016: 1343; Pattyn, 2014: 351). Therefore, this
article develops such an approach in the context of the EU, building on two poten-
tial motives for the Commission: an enforcement motive and a strategic motive.
These motives are closely linked to ongoing academic debates about the nature of
the Commission (Boswell, 2008: 472; Franchino, 2007: 11; Hartlapp et al., 2015: 1;
Radaelli, 1999: 760–762; Wille, 2010: 1098).
Enforcement motive
In its role of ‘guardian of the European treaties’, the Commission has the task to
monitor and enforce member state compliance with EU legislation (Schmidt and
Wonka, 2013: 2). EPL evaluations are potentially useful for this purpose, as they
can collect and present information about how rules are implemented in practice
(Coglianese, 2012: 11). This, in turn, makes EPL evaluations useful to hold those
actors responsible for the implementation of legislation accountable (Vedung,
1997: 102). Therefore, EPL evaluations are a potential tool for the Commission
to detect non-compliance by the member states and to address such
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non-compliance via enforcement measures (European Commission, 2015: 292;
Stame, 2008: 124).
The role of EPL evaluations in enforcing European legislation is also evident
from earlier research about this topic. Mastenbroek et al. (2016: 1339) found that
out of 216 EPL evaluations conducted or outsourced by the Commission between
2000 and 2012, 79% assessed the processes of legislative implementation, enforce-
ment and/or compliance. Zhelyazkova et al. (2016: 833) found EPL evaluations to
be the most detailed source of information about the compliance of member states
with 24 directives of interest.
Those EPL evaluations that study member state compliance often assess the
legal implementation of directives by systematically comparing national trans-
position measures, while they tend to assess the practical implementation of
European legislation via surveys and interviews among stakeholders. In some
cases, infringement data are also used as a source (Smith, 2015: 92–93). EPL
evaluations that address member state compliance also tend to include recom-
mendations for the Commission. Often these recommendations focus on ‘soft’
measures like increased monitoring, sharing best practices or publishing
guidelines for national implementing authorities, but evaluations may also rec-
ommend the Commission to launch infringement procedures (Mastenbroek
et al., 2016).
If the Commission can use EPL evaluations for enforcement purposes, we can
expect that the chances than an evaluation is initiated are higher for pieces of law
where there is a greater need to scrutinize the member states. In other words, we
can expect that the chances that an evaluation is initiated are higher for legislation
that oﬀers more opportunities for non-compliance.
Three speciﬁc variables may be important in this regard. Firstly, the type of
legislation may aﬀect the chances of non-compliance. Directives oﬀer the
member states more discretion than regulations because they need to be transposed
into national law (Treib, 2014: 6). In turn, this discretion oﬀers the member states
more opportunities to delay or prevent implementation (Kaeding, 2006: 232; Ko¨nig
and Ma¨der, 2014: 247; Mastenbroek, 2003: 372; Steunenberg and Rhinard, 2010:
495; Treib, 2014: 6). Therefore, we expect directives to be more likely to be eval-
uated than regulations (Stame, 2008: 124).
H1: Directives are more likely to be evaluated than regulations.
Secondly, the complexity of legislation can aﬀect the chances of non-compliance.
Since the European legislative process includes multiple veto players – notably the
Commission, the Council and the EP – decision making often produces comprom-
ises that are laid down in long and ambiguous texts (Ha¨ge, 2007: 307–308;
Hofmann, 2013: 99). Such complexity oﬀers member states more leeway for inter-
pretation, and, therefore, makes it more diﬃcult to establish whether they are
complying with legislation or not (Kaeding, 2006: 242; Ko¨nig and Ma¨der, 2014:
253–254; Mastenbroek, 2003: 376; Steunenberg and Rhinard, 2010: 501). This in
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turn can be expected to increase the chance that legislation is evaluated by the
Commission.
H2: The more complex a piece of law, the higher its chances of being evaluated.
Thirdly, the political sensitivity of legislation may aﬀect the chances of non-
compliance. The more controversial a regulation or directive, the more likely it is
that some member states who opposed it during the legislative process will not
implement it correctly (Mastenbroek, 2003: 376). Since the Council represents the
member states, politicization in the Council is especially likely to increase the
chances of non-compliance (Treib, 2014: 14), and, therefore, the chances that an
evaluation is initiated.
H3: The more politicized a piece of law was in the Council, the more likely it is to be
evaluated.
Strategic motive
The hypotheses presented above are in line with the image of the Commission as
the ‘guardian of the European treaties’. However, in recent years scholars have
increasingly viewed the Commission as an actor that not only fulﬁls the tasks
that the member states have delegated to it (such as enforcing European legis-
lation), but also strategically pursues its own preferences (Franchino, 2007: 11;
Hartlapp et al., 2015: 1–14; Wille, 2010: 1099). According to this political view
on the Commission the institution has a perpetual interest to protect its compe-
tences, as without these competences it would not be able to achieve any of its
(temporary) political aims (Hartlapp et al., 2015: 1; Majone, 2005: 65; Pollack,
2008: 9).
The Commission has been shown to deal strategically with ex-ante evaluations
of legislation (impact assessments) (Poptcheva, 2013: 4; Torriti, 2010: 1065) and
expert knowledge in general (Boswell, 2008: 472), so we can expect strategic con-
siderations to play a role in decisions about the initiation of EPL evaluations as
well. Ex-post evaluations are not just neutral instruments that can be used to stay
informed about policy implementation, but also potential strategic tools that can
strengthen or weaken the positions of actors (Bovens et al., 2008: 320; Schwartz,
1998: 295; Vedung, 1997: 111). As evaluations suggest changes to existing arrange-
ments, they are inherently advantageous to some actors and disadvantageous to
others (Bovens et al., 2008: 320; Weiss, 1993: 95–98). Negative evaluations can be
particularly disadvantageous to actors that are responsible for delivering policies,
as such evaluations may lead to demands to roll back their competences or to put
them under closer supervision (Vedung, 1997: 102–108). This, in turn, may be an
incentive for such actors to avoid evaluations that may have negative consequences
(Schwartz, 1998: 295; Weiss, 1993: 95).
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Therefore, we can expect the Commission to be reluctant to initiate EPL evalu-
ations in situations where the results of such evaluations could be harmful to its
interests. The Commission’s better regulation agenda oﬃcially endorses the idea
that EU legislation should be signiﬁcantly amended or even repealed if an evalu-
ation shows that it has no added value (European Commission, 2012: 3; 2013: 1;
2015: 254). In reality, however, we can expect that the Commission wants to avoid
such situations to protect its competences (Majone, 2005: 65). In other words, we
expect the chances that a piece of law is evaluated to be lower if the potential
evaluation is more likely to be used to argue for signiﬁcant amendments to the law.
Involvement of the European Parliament (EP) in decision making decreases the
chances of signiﬁcant amendments and is therefore expected to increase the chances
that an evaluation is initiated. The reason for this is that the EP provides an extra
veto player that can block amendments (Ha¨ge, 2007: 307; Hofmann, 2013: 102). As
a majority of EP members generally supports further European integration
(Pollack, 2008: 9), it can also be expected that the EP will usually oppose reducing
the competences of supranational institutions like the Commission.
H4: Pieces of law that can only be amended with the approval of the European
Parliament are more likely to be evaluated than pieces of law that can be amended
without the approval of the European Parliament.
The voting procedure in the Council is also expected to inﬂuence the chances of
legislative amendments. If unanimity is required in the Council it is signiﬁcantly
harder to change legislation, as it is diﬃcult to make all member states agree on a
proposal (Ha¨ge, 2007: 308). We therefore expect the chances that an evaluation is
initiated to be higher when the Council applies unanimity voting, as compared to
when it applies qualiﬁed majority voting (QMV).
H5: Pieces of law decided upon by unanimity in the Council are more likely to be
evaluated than pieces of law decided upon by qualiﬁed majority voting.
Control variables
Aside from the two theoretical explanations described above, this research controls
for two other potential explanations for decisions to initiate EPL evaluations. The
ﬁrst control variable is the presence of an evaluation clause. Many EU regulations
and directives contain provisions that oblige the Commission to evaluate them
after a number of years, which are usually inserted by the Council and the EP to
ensure that they will stay informed about the legislation (Summa and Toulemonde,
2002: 410). We can expect legislation containing an evaluation clause to be eval-
uated more often than legislation without such a clause.
The second control variable is the evaluation capacity of the responsible DG. In
this context, evaluation capacity is deﬁned as the presence of suﬃcient means and
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processes to ensure that evaluation is an ongoing practice in an organization
(Nielsen et al., 2011: 325). Evaluation capacity includes the presence of organiza-
tional structures and procedures that support evaluations, the presence of suﬃcient
ﬁnancial and human capital to evaluate and the presence of proper (methodo-
logical) tools to conduct evaluations (Nielsen et al., 2011: 326–327). Since evalu-
ation capacity varies primarily between the DGs of the Commission (Van Voorst,
2017: 25), we expect that legislation under the responsibility of DGs with higher
evaluation capacity is more likely to be evaluated than other legislation.
We could also expect the Commission to be more likely to initiate an EPL evalu-
ation if an ex-ante evaluation (impact assessment) of the same legislation was carried
out, as impact assessments often contain a section prescribing that legislation should
be evaluated ex-post (European Commission, 2015: 246–251). However, this variable
cannot be studied in this research because the Commission’s system for impact
assessments was only set up in 2002–2003 (European Commission, 2007: 4).
Methods and data
Data collection
Although multiple datasets of EU legislation already exist (e.g. Hofmann, 2013: 102;
Treib, 2014: 27), none of them suited the speciﬁc aims of our research. Therefore, we
created two datasets for the task at hand, one containing major European legislation
and one containing EPL evaluations (also see Mastenbroek et al., 2016).
The dataset of legislation covers the years 2000–2004. This period was chosen to
give the Commission suﬃcient time to evaluate. While academic literature indicates
that legislation is usually evaluated after about ﬁve years (Eijlander and Voermans,
2000: 355) and evaluation clauses in EU legislation also tend to give the
Commission ﬁve years or less to evaluate, we decided to double this period to
avoid concluding that any legislation has not been evaluated while an evaluation
was in fact still upcoming. Therefore, our dataset of legislation stops at the end of
2004, but it should be emphasized that our article concerns decisions to initiate
EPL evaluations over a period of 15 years (2000–2014), which is further explained
by the description of our second dataset below.
Because the Commission follows the logic that the resources spent on an evalu-
ation must be proportionate to the importance of a measure (European
Commission, 2007: 22; 2015: 255–256), minor EU legislation does not have to be
evaluated (European Commission, 2015: 253). Therefore, our dataset of legislation
only includes major regulations and directives. We excluded all delegated and
implementing acts,1 which are generally considered less important than primary
legislation (Franchino, 2007: 80), as well as all rectiﬁcations, amendments and
secondary Council legislation. Because of the explicit link between evaluations
and improving the eﬀects of legislation on European citizens and companies
(European Commission, 2007: 3; 2012: 2; 2013: 1–2), we also excluded legislation
without direct relevance for national actors. This includes legislation that only
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addresses EU institutions or foreign countries. Together, the selection criteria led
to a dataset of 277 major directives and regulations adopted in the period 2000–
2004. Our dataset of evaluations (see below) contains only eight evaluations of
legislation that we did not consider ‘major’ (2% of all evaluations), indicating
that our selection criteria were fairly appropriate.
To assess the initiation ratio of evaluations, our dependent variable, we
extracted information from a second dataset. This dataset contains 313 EPL evalu-
ations of regulations, directives and treaty articles conducted or outsourced by the
Commission between 2000 and 2014 (Mastenbroek et al., 2016: 1334–1335).2
Evaluations completed before 2000 were omitted because of a lack of data, and
evaluations merely containing studying prescriptions for foreign countries and EU
institutions were excluded for the same reasons as discussed above. We also dis-
carded those evaluation reports that merely summarize other evaluations.
The evaluations were gathered from diﬀerent sources: The Commission’s multi-
annual evaluation overview (2010), the Commission’s search engine for evalu-
ations,3 the Commission’s work programmes,4 EU bookshop,5 annexes to the
Commission’s ﬁnancial reports,6 and lists of evaluations found on the websites
of DGs. We checked our data using an existing list of evaluations produced by
expertise centre Eureval, by running Google searches for evaluations of all major
legislation adopted between 1996 and 2010, by searching for background docu-
ments of legislation in Eur-lex,7 and by discussing our data-gathering method with
the SG (for a further description of the dataset of EPL evaluations, see
Mastenbroek et al., 2016: 1334–1335).
Operationalization
Starting with the enforcement motive, the type of legislation (hypothesis 1) was
measured as a dichotomous variable (directive or regulation). The complexity of
legislation (hypothesis 2) was measured through its number of recitals, as more
complex legislation generally requires a larger number of explanations (Franchino,
2000: 74; Kaeding, 2006: 236; Steunenberg and Rhinard, 2010: 501; Treib, 2014:
26). Politicization in the Council (hypothesis 3) was measured by determining if a
legislative proposal was on the Council’s agenda as a B-point, as B-points represent
the topics that are actively debated at the political level (Ha¨ge, 2007: 303;
Hofmann, 2013: 126; Ko¨nig, 2008: 149).
Concerning the strategic motive, involvement of the European Parliament
(hypothesis 4) was measured by looking at the formal procedure used to enact
the legislation as stated by Eur-lex. In case of the ordinary legislative procedure
(former codecision and cooperation procedures) this involvement was considered
high, while in case of the consultation procedure it was considered low (Ha¨ge, 2007:
316). The voting procedure in the Council (hypothesis 5) was also measured as a
dichotomous variable (QMV or unanimity) using Eur-lex.
Concerning the control variables, we searched each piece of law using speciﬁc
keywords8 to establish the presence of an evaluation clause (yes/no). We also
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checked the last ﬁve articles of each regulation or directive, as this is the most
common place for evaluation clauses. Concerning evaluation capacity, we mea-
sured 12 indicators derived from a model developed by Nielsen et al. (2011, 326–
330) via interviews with the European Commission (Van Voorst, 2017: 29–31).
However, only the presence of a specialized evaluation (sub-)unit (yes/no) and the
presence of evaluation guidelines (yes/no) could be established per DG per year
and were, therefore, useful as indicators. For legislation that has been evaluated,
the data used concern the year when the evaluation was published. For legislation
that has not been evaluated, we assumed that this decision was made ﬁve years
after the legislation was published (the modal value of the time between publica-
tion dates of legislation and publication dates of evaluations is six years in our
dataset, from which we subtracted one year as evaluations usually take that long
to conduct) and determined the scores for evaluation capacity accordingly.
However, because this assumption of ﬁve years is somewhat arbitrary we also
experimented with other time periods, which aﬀected our results to some extent.9
The operationalization of all our variables is summarized in the table in the
Online appendix. Because of the binary nature of our dependent variable, logistic
regression was used for the analysis. The variables belonging to the two motives to
evaluate were entered as blocs to allow for comparisons between the models.
Results
Out of the 277 major regulations and directives in our dataset, 116 have been
evaluated ex-post. This is an initiation ratio of 41.9%, meaning that about six
out of 10 major pieces of EU law from 2000 to 2004 have not (yet) been evaluated
by the Commission. This initiation ratio is higher than the 33% found during
earlier research about major legislation from 2000 to 2002 (Mastenbroek et al.,
2016: 1338), indicating that legislation published during 2003–2004 was evaluated
more often than older legislation. This is a sign that the proportion of legislation
evaluated by the Commission may be increasing over time.
A few pieces of law in our dataset were evaluated multiple times over the years:
15 pieces of law were evaluated twice, four pieces of law were evaluated thrice and
two pieces of law were evaluated four times. Due to the binary nature of our
dependent variable, these pieces of law with more than one evaluation have no
special impact on our analysis: they were simply coded as 1. Their number was also
too low to conduct an additional analysis of the number of times that a piece of law
was evaluated.
Figure 1 below depicts the initiation ratio per DG. The three DGs with the
highest initiation ratios are DG Eurostat (71.4%), DG Competition (66.0%) and
DG Internal Market (65.2%). DG Trade and DG Economic and Financial Aﬀairs
have not evaluated their few major pieces of law from 2000 to 2004 at all; besides
this the three DGs with the lowest initiation ratios are DG Energy (28.6%), DG
Home Aﬀairs (28.0%), and DG Agriculture (20.8%). The variation among DGs is
included in the analysis through the evaluation capacity variables; the data do not
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suggest other patterns concerning the size or policy areas of the DGs that warrant
investigation.
Table 1 below presents the explanatory analysis. The results show that the model
with the variables belonging to the enforcement motive and the control variables
only passes the chi-square test and is therefore signiﬁcant. Aside from politicization
in the Council all the individual variables included in this model are also signiﬁcant.
Table 1 furthermore shows that if the variables related to the strategic motive are
added, the model as a whole and the individual variables that were signiﬁcant
before are still signiﬁcant. However, neither the involvement of the EP nor the
voting procedure in the Council provides an explanation for variation in the initi-
ation of EPL evaluations. Below each variable will be discussed in detail.
Starting with the type of legislation, the ﬁrst variable belonging to the enforce-
ment model, Table 1 shows that the odds of being evaluated are about 2.05 times
higher for directives than for regulations. In terms of predicted probabilities –
which are easier to interpret than odds ratios – the chances of an evaluation
taking place are 14.0% higher for directives than for regulations, if all other vari-
ables are kept at their observed values. In terms of descriptive statistics, out of the
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Figure 1. Initiation ratio per DG.
Note: AG: agriculture; CM: competition; CN: communications and technology; DG:
Directorates-General; EC: economic and financial affairs; EM: employment; ER: energy; ES:
Eurostat; ET: enterprise and industry; EV: environment; HO: home affairs; JU: justice; ME: mari-
time affairs; MK: internal market; MV: transport; SA: health and consumers; TA: taxation; TR:
trade. Some DGs have merged and/or changed their names since 2014.
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141 major directives in our dataset, 51.8% have been evaluated; out of the 136
major regulations, only 31.6% have been evaluated. In line with hypothesis 1, these
ﬁndings indicate that the Commission prioritizes evaluating directives over
regulations.
The complexity of legislation, the second variable belonging to the enforcement
model, also signiﬁcantly increases the chances of an evaluation occurring. For
every extra recital, the odds of a piece of law being evaluated increase by about
3%. Figure 2 below presents the eﬀect of this variable in terms of predicted prob-
abilities. The ﬁgure shows that the chances of an evaluation occurring increase
from about 0.3 to 0.7 as the number of recitals grows, with an average growth
in predicted probability of 0.06% per recital, if all other variables are kept at their
observed values. These ﬁndings are in line with hypothesis 2.
Politicization in the Council, the third variable belonging to the enforcement
model that was measured by the occurrence of the legislative proposal as a
B-point on the Council’s agenda, is not signiﬁcant. Accordingly, we reject
hypothesis 3.
Turning to the political variables, the results in Table 1 show that neither the
involvement of the EP nor the voting procedure in the Council provides a signiﬁ-
cant explanation for variation in the initiation of EPL evaluations. This means that
hypotheses 4 and 5 are rejected. These results indicate that the chances of a piece of
Table 1. Results of the logistic regression.
Model 1:
Enforcement motive
Model 2:
Strategic motive
B (SE) Sig. Odds ratio B (SE) Sig. Odds ratio
Constant 2.57 (0.41) .00 0.08 2.65 (0.43) .00 0.07
Legislation type 0.66 (0.29) .02 1.93 0.72 (0.30) .02 2.05
Complexity 0.03 (0.01) .02 1.03 0.03 (0.01) .02 1.03
Politicization 0.51 (0.32) .11 0.60 0.50 (0.32) .12 0.60
Council voting 0.15 (0.36) .69 0.86
EP involvement 0.46 (0.49) .35 1.58
Clause 1.57 (0.33) .00 4.79 1.55 (0.34) .00 4.69
Unit 0.87 (0.31) .01 2.38 0.95 (0.32) .00 2.59
Guidelines 0.73 (0.30) .01 2.08 0.82 (0.31) .01 2.26
N 277 277
Chi2 62.70 64.62
Sig 0.00 0.00
McFadden R2 0.17 0.17
AIC 1.184 1.191
AIC: Akaike information criterion.
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law being signiﬁcantly amended do not aﬀect the Commission’s decision to evalu-
ate it or not.
Conversely, both control variables turn out to be signiﬁcant. Table 1 shows that
the odds of a piece of law being evaluated become about 4.69 times higher if an
evaluation clause is present as compared to legislation without such a clause. In
terms of predicted probabilities, the chances of an evaluation taking place are
30.9% higher for legislation with an evaluation clause than for legislation without
such a clause, if all other variables are kept at their observed values.
Despite the signiﬁcance of this variable, it should be noted that only 92 out of
165 pieces of law with an evaluation clause (55.8%) were evaluated, while 24 out of
112 pieces of law without such a clause (21.4%) were evaluated as well. The ﬁrst
number shows that the Commission only complied with a little more than half of
the evaluation clauses inserted in major legislation from 2000 to 2004, indicating
that the presence of such clauses is not a guarantee that legislation will be evalu-
ated. The numbers also show that the presence of evaluation clauses only explains a
part of the variation in the initiation of EPL evaluations.
Table 1 also shows that both indicators for evaluation capacity are signiﬁcant.
The odds of a piece of law being evaluated are about 2.59 times higher for legis-
lation of a DG with an evaluation unit as compared to legislation of a DG without
such a unit, and 2.26 times higher for legislation of a DG that has evaluation
guidelines as compared to legislation of a DG without such guidelines. In terms
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Figure 2. Effect of legislative complexity on the probability of an evaluation occuring.
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of predicted probabilities, the chances of an evaluation taking place are 18.3%
higher in the ﬁrst case and 15.9% higher in the second case, if all other variables
are kept at their observed values.
When interpreting these results, however, it should be noted that high evaluation
capacity may be a consequence as well as a cause of evaluation-related activities.
For example, it is possible that DGs that initiate more EPL evaluations also invest
more in evaluation guidelines to support such evaluative activities. It should also be
noted that the results concerning evaluation capacity somewhat depend on our
assumptions about the number of years after which it was decided not to evaluate
certain legislation (as explained in our methodology section and Note 9).
Therefore, more research is needed to establish the exact eﬀect of evaluation cap-
acity on the initiation of EPL evaluations in the EU.
Conclusion
This article has sought to describe and explain the variance in the initiation of EPL
evaluations by the European Commission. Although the Commission oﬃcially
endorses EPL evaluations (European Commission, 2007: 3; 2013: 11; 2015: 296),
little was known about how systematically the institution conducts such evalu-
ations in practice (but see Mastenbroek et al., 2016). This study aimed to shed
light on this underexplored topic by developing a theoretical approach based on
two motives for the Commission to evaluate – an enforcement and a strategic
motive – while controlling for other potential explanations. We tested these explan-
ations with the help of binary logistic regression, based on two self-developed
datasets.
The results show that less than half of all major EU legislation from 2000 to
2004 (41.9%) was evaluated. However, the proportion of evaluated legislation has
increased over time. Only a small proportion of the major legislation was evaluated
more than once.
Concerning the enforcement motive, our results suggest that the odds of being
evaluated are signiﬁcantly higher for directives than for regulations, and that these
odds also increase signiﬁcantly as legislation becomes more complex. This indicates
that the Commission prioritizes evaluating legislation for which the chances of
non-compliance are relatively high, and that evaluations may at least partly be
initiated to scrutinize member state implementation. Concerning the strategic
motive, however, we did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant results. This indicates that the
risk of EU legislation being signiﬁcantly amended does not aﬀect its odds of being
evaluated.
Two control variables also turned out to be signiﬁcant. Firstly, the odds of
legislation being evaluated increase signiﬁcantly if that legislation contains an
evaluation clause. However, our data also revealed that the Commission only
complies with such clauses in about half of all cases. Secondly, the evaluation
capacity of the DG that is responsible for the legislation signiﬁcantly increases
the odds of that legislation being evaluated.
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In conclusion, our analysis indicates that the initiation of EPL evaluations by
the Commission is best explained by a mix of its need to enforce EU legislation
towards the member states, its formal obligations to evaluate and its evaluation
capacity. However, these conclusions should be viewed in the light of two possible
limitations of this research. Firstly, the quantitative nature of our study required us
to use indicators that could be measured eﬃciently for a large number of cases.
Some of these indicators may not entirely cover the abstract concepts that they are
supposed to represent, such as evaluation capacity and politicization. Therefore, to
sustain the conclusions of this article, a follow-up case study with more sophisti-
cated indicators would be useful.
A second limitation of this study is its time period. As explained above, EPL
evaluations may be conducted a decade or more after a piece of law enters into
force, so we could not yet assess the extent to which legislation from after 2004 has
been evaluated without risking a bias in our data. Whereas our dataset of 277
major regulations and directives (initiated by seventeen DGs) is so broad that
our ﬁndings are probably not aﬀected by any particular political choice made
during 2000 to 2004, it still seems worthwhile to repeat this research in the
future to assess to what extent post-2005 legislation is evaluated.
Two other possibilities for future research stand out. Firstly, since this article
showed that the Commission does not always comply with evaluation clauses, a
follow-up study about the reasons for this seems worthwhile. Secondly, it could be
examined to what extent the factors presented in this study also explain variance in
the quality of EPL evaluations, as this is another important characteristic of a
proper evaluation system and previous research has shown that the quality of
the Commission’s EPL evaluations varies greatly (Mastenbroek et al., 2016:
1340–1341).
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Notes
1. This refers to all legislation having its legal basis in another regulation or directive.
2. Evaluations published in 2013 and 2014 were added to the dataset used in Mastenbroek
et al. (2016), resulting in a total of 313 cases. Six further evaluations published in French
were excluded because of our lacking language skills. However, including these evalu-
ations would not have changed the results, since they did not study additional legislation
from 2000 to 2004.
3. ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/evaluation/search/search.do
4. http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/key-documents/index_en.htm
5. https://bookshop.europa.eu/en/home/
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6. SWD(2013)228 and SWD(2012)383.
7. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html
8. ‘evalu*’, ‘repo*’, ‘stud*’ and ‘research’.
9. As described in the methodology section of our article, for legislation that was not
evaluated we entered our evaluation capacity data based on the assumption that decisions
not to evaluate were taken five years after the publication date of the legislation. We
experimented with other time periods than five years for this as well (four, six, seven and
eight years). If we assume decisions not to evaluate to be taken after six years instead of
five the presence of an evaluation unit is no longer significant, and if we assume this
period to be seven years or more both indicators for evaluation capacity seize to be
significant. However, assuming a lesser number of years than five does not change the
significance of either indicator. The reason for these different findings appears to be that
some of the earliest DGs to develop evaluation units and/or guidelines (DG Eurostat,
DG Internal Market and DG Employment in particular) also have the highest initiation
ratios (as listed in Figure 1). Around 2010 many DGs that have smaller initiation ratios
also started to develop such evaluation capacity. Therefore, belonging to a DG that was a
frontrunner in building evaluation capacity could be more important than belonging to a
DG with high evaluation capacity per se when it comes to explaining variation in the
initiation of EPL evaluations.
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